By Arshaluys Mghdesyan
The domestic political tension in the United States, which is accompanied by the ongoing migration crisis and has strong pre-election undertones, will reduce the country’s initiative in foreign policy matters at least until the presidential elections in November. This is bad news for an Armenia pinning its hopes on the mediation efforts of the West – and a window of opportunity for Azerbaijan.
The increase in domestic political tension in the United States is inversely proportional to the country’s activity in foreign, including on the Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani issues.
For a long time now, Ukraine has not received significant U.S. military assistance, which led to the stabilization of the front (for Russia), and in some areas to the strengthening of the Russian army’s positions. Ukraine’s military aid package has been effectively held hostage in Congress as a result of the deepening domestic political tensions.
Public discontent is growing in the United States and Europe about possible multibillion-dollar support programs for Ukraine.
The other pole of the West, the European Union, has limited resources and motivations, which are largely determined by decisions made “across the pond.”
Azerbaijan’s escalating rhetoric may largely be due to the pre-election situation in the United States, when the incumbent president and his administration find themselves as “lame ducks” for at least a few months. Many people can say, “What weight does Azerbaijan have? If Washington wishes, even in a tense domestic political situation, it can cool down the hotheads in Baku with just a few decisions.”
Maybe Azerbaijan is not invulnerable, maybe it is quite vulnerable. But first of all, it is hard to imagine that such decisions will be made very quickly and promptly, given the pre-election period. Especially since the United States has already once warned about not tolerating ethnic cleansing in Artsakh and…and nothing.
Ethnic cleansing is a reality, and Washington has adapted to the new regional reality, where there is no entity called Nagorno-Karabakh.
Another important consideration is that overall, the South Caucasus is not among the priorities of U.S. global policy. Moreover, the United States is unlikely to get into confrontations with Azerbaijan and its patrons in Turkey for Armenia’s sake.
Above all, the United States is interested in the weakening of Russia’s positions in all directions. The parties have returned to the logic of the Cold War. The South Caucasus is one of those directions, but not the key one. The main direction is Ukraine, especially from the point of view of changes in the world order, and that is so important that both sides are ready for war.
The South Caucasus is a secondary battlefield. That is why both Russia and the West are not going to raise the stakes here. This is the reason for the West’s reluctance to provide security guarantees when the Armenian side raises this issue with its Western partners. This is neither bad nor good. This is about interests and their importance, which determines the nature of the resources invested.
Therefore, at least until November or December, a new window of opportunity is open for Azerbaijan, as it was opened in 2022 against the background of the Russian army’s failures in Ukraine, which Baku took full advantage of.
But there is one difference: this time it may be more complicated due to Russia’s disposition, for which the prospect of leaving Nagorno-Karabakh exacerbates its geopolitical instinct to cling to the region. One of the unique opportunities for its implementation is the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” and more precisely, control over that potential route.
This is Russia’s way back into the South Caucasus. We can assume that Russia will react to any new attack by Azerbaijan on Armenia with maximum diplomatic and political tools, but never with military backing.
Given this perspective, many are warning that 2024 could be even more unpredictable for Armenia. They emphasize, above all, the need for domestic resilience to address confrontational scenarios arising from Baku. In short, the window of opportunity for Armenia to go through a year without war is narrowing.
Arshaluys Mghdesyan is a TV host and political commentator at CivilNet.
Read the article in Armenian.
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