By Taner Akçam
Abdullah Öcalan, jailed leader of the PKK, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, a militant political organization, has made a historic call, declaring that the PKK, a product of the Cold War era, has reached the end of its lifespan and should convene a congress to terminate its armed struggle and dissolve itself. For successive Turkish governments, limiting the place and role – and even rejecting the very existence – of its large Kurdish minority in Turkey has been foundational policy, generating much government-initiated violence against Kurds (and therefore retaliation), both in and out of the country. Thus, the promise of such a historic transformation — for all sides, and for the region — must be examined and understood, starting now, in its early days.
If the PKK agrees (one must assume that it already has – or this call would not have been made), the longest and largest Kurdish uprising, which began in 1984, is coming to an end. Öcalan’s statement can be interpreted in three different ways:
The first interpretation views the issue as a negotiation or a give-and-take relationship. From this perspective, the state “gave almost nothing,” and Öcalan (and the PKK) surrendered “without receiving anything in return.” Those who approach the matter with this transactional mindset believe, in crude terms, that “the goods were sold too cheaply.” Some call this an unconditional surrender. This group points to the oppressive policies recently introduced by the Erdoğan regime, such as the appointment of trustees to replace democratically elected (Kurdish) mayors who are imprisoned, and mass arrests, arguing that the process will not lead to democratization but rather to the consolidation of Erdoğan’s dictatorship.
A second way to interpret the call is also rooted in the notion of “negotiation,” but it presents additional arguments. According to this view, the state deliberately structured the process in two layers to prevent it from being perceived as a direct “negotiation” between the parties. On the surface, vague and broadly framed rhetoric about “Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood” was repeated, while behind the scenes, negotiation-type discussions are still ongoing. Even if these discussions were not conducted in the form of a conventional “negotiation,” the Kurdish side (PKK) must have received certain guarantees to announce their adherence to Öcalan’s call. Those who lean toward this perspective believe that a general framework agreement has, in fact, been reached. Öcalan, too, made his statement with the knowledge that this general framework had been agreed upon and that the PKK will follow suit.
What are the points of agreement that led Öcalan to be certain that the PKK would follow his proposal? That’s the main problem: No one is providing information on what exactly has been agreed upon in these negotiations. Those who are at the forefront of the process either genuinely do not know or are guarding a closely-held secret under a strict oath of silence. Based on what I have followed in the press, the only concrete information I could find came from a speech by İbrahim Halil Baran, the founding leader of a Kurdish organization called the Kurdistani Party (PAKURD). On his personal YouTube channel, Baran mentioned a “Zipper Strategy,” which, according to him, is the agreed-upon approach between the parties. The idea behind this is a step-by-step process—one step by the state, one step by the organization. From this perspective, Öcalan appears to be acting more as a mediator in this process.
There is a third way to interpret the statement. This is not a popular interpretation, but I find myself agreeing with it. Here is the core of this perspective: Even if done unilaterally and without any tangible concessions in return, the PKK’s ending the armed struggle and dissolving as an organization would be the greatest gift offered to Turkish society in the direction of democratization. One of the most fundamental and significant obstacles to democratization has been the paradigm of “armed struggle” or “terrorism,” which has blocked progress like a stopper in a bottle. As Öcalan stated, ending an armed struggle that has no practical benefits is such a significant achievement that it renders irrelevant the question of “what was gained in return?”
Furthermore, even if the PKK dissolves itself as an organization, it will continue to exist through a pro-Kurdish political party – the Turkish DEM Party – or through other civil structures in Turkey. Therefore, once this blockage is removed, those who claim that “nothing was gained” will soon realize that rights can be secured through civil society activism. Besides, it seems that the PKK (and Öcalan) have received assurances regarding their expectations.
Baran, the Kurdish politician, had mentioned in a broadcast last year that there was actually a 60-article document discussed between the parties. Initially, the PKK was not satisfied with these terms, but over time, especially after the recent developments in Syria, it appears to have been convinced. Baran categorized the agreed-upon provisions under three main headings and specifically noted that he had obtained this information from PKK sources.
According to this, first, the PKK will not immediately lay down its arms but will withdraw from certain regions. It is known that discussions have taken place with Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) regarding the location and logistical details of this withdrawal, and some agreements have been reached.
The second key point proposes a fundamental agreement to amend Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution, which states that “Everyone bound to the Turkish state by citizenship is a Turk.” This amendment is expected to pave the way for the principle of equal citizenship. The third major point of agreement appears to be the introduction of mother-tongue education, allowing for broader use of the Kurdish language in education. The fourth point concerns partial legal arrangements leading to a general amnesty. Initially, a sentence reduction law will be introduced, and this process is expected to culminate in a general amnesty.
Given the seismic changes these ideas would bring about, it should be noted that these are not clearly defined agreements but rather general understandings and directions in what Baran had described as the “Zipper Strategy”—the organization will take one step, followed by a step from the state, with Öcalan as mediator.
Öcalan’s statement did not mention Syria or Rojava, which was not an oversight. This is because there are multiple political actors involved in that region, and Syria has its unique dynamics. There are three different tables – Turkey and the US, Kurds and Damascus, Turkey and Damascus – around which three separate negotiations are taking place among four parties.
Yet, there remains a fundamental contradiction in this process. On the one hand, there is talk of peace and resolving the Kurdish issue; on the other hand, appointed trustees continue to replace elected leaders, and a climate of political repression persists. Mayors and officials, artists, writers, and many political activists associated with the CHP Party, Erdogan’s opposition, people who have never been involved in violence, are being detained and arrested. The country is gripped by an atmosphere of fear and repression. The scale of the arrests is so vast that they are rightly being described as a “civil coup.”
How can this blatant contradiction—political repression on one hand, peace talks on the other—be explained? So far, I can identify three different explanations in the conversations on the topic.
The first explanation: Erdoğan is not satisfied with the process, and the developments signal a rift within the state. A faction within the state supports this plan, and Erdoğan, unable to openly oppose it, is trying to obstruct it through indirect means. His main priority is securing his hold on power, and he is at odds with such long-term strategic plans.
A possible second explanation is this: The state learned from its mistakes during the first peace process in 2013. At that time, it failed to control the process, and as a result, the PKK allegedly prepared for an uprising and stockpiled weapons in cities. According to this view, the 2015 PKK rebellion was rooted in the groundwork laid during the peace talks. Consequently, the state is now taking a much more cautious approach, choosing not to ease tensions but to tighten control instead. This contradiction will supposedly fade over time.
The third explanation is this: The state is deliberately creating extreme pressure on society and opposition forces to ensure that no alternative to Öcalan’s plan emerges. In other words, the repression is a strategy to make Öcalan appear as the only viable option. There is a Turkish saying: “Show them death so they accept malaria.” By intensifying repression (the “death” scenario), the goal is to force those who dislike Öcalan’s proposed roadmap to accept it as the lesser evil (the “malaria” scenario).
We have no concrete information on which interpretation is correct. We are merely speculating. However, this clear contradiction leads some people to argue that there is a growing gap between democracy and the resolution of the Kurdish issue. According to this view, Erdoğan is trying to resolve the Kurdish issue without a democratic opening. He may grant certain rights to the Kurds, but he will make those rights conditional on his re-election, thereby ensuring the continuation of his authoritarian regime. Looking at the government’s latest anti-democratic actions, the idea that the Kurdish issue can be resolved without democratic reforms does not seem like a serious possibility. Without changes in the current legal system, no issue can be resolved—it is as simple as that. In other words, unless democratic steps are taken (such as amending Article 66 of the Constitution or granting the right to education in one’s mother tongue), no issue will be resolved.
In summary, talking about peace is better than waging war. While ending the armed struggle, dissolving the PKK in its current form, and transitioning to civil politics under a new political movement (such as within DEM) may take a long time, it would mark the beginning of a new era for both Turkey and the region.
Professor Taner Akçam is the inaugural director of the Armenian Genocide Research Program of the Promise Armenian Institute at UCLA. Previously he was the Kaloosdian and Mugar Chair in Modern Armenian History and Genocide in the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University.
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