By Didier Holleaux
The article was published in the April 21 issue of the World Energy Weekly, a publication of Petrostrategies, a French think tank specializing in energy issues.
The Eastern Mediterranean has been a zone of territorial and political conflicts since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but gas discoveries have fostered surprising instances of cooperation in the region.
Historically, Egypt was the only significant gas producer in the region. The discovery of large gas reserves in Egypt’s offshore fields led to the construction of liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta in 2005, enabling the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily to Europe. However, a combination of lower-than-expected output from some gas fields and rising domestic demand in Egypt, particularly for electricity production, resulted in recurring challenges in operating these plants at full capacity, leading to their shutdowns (Damietta in 2013 and Idku in 2015).
New discoveries, particularly the Zohr field (brought online in late 2017), improved Egypt’s gas supply but still did not enable the liquefaction plants to operate at full capacity. Meanwhile, other discoveries were made in neighboring countries, including the Aphrodite field in Cypriot waters (2011), Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) in Israeli waters, as well as smaller fields like Gaza Marine (discovered in 2000) and Karish (2011) and Tanin (2013) in contested waters between Is- rael and Lebanon.
These discoveries and the potential to market this gas at high European prices led to unexpected collaborations, considering the region’s historically fraught relationships. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), established informally in 2019 and formalized in 2020, brings together Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Palestine, France, Greece, and Italy. Its aim was to define and build shared infrastructure to export surplus gas to Europe. While the forum’s formation itself was a success, its goals remain as distant today as when it was founded. Nonetheless, smaller, pragmatic initiatives have emerged on the sidelines.
In 2021, Egypt and Israel reached an agreement to reverse the flow of two pipelines initially built to export Egyptian gas eastward (the Arab Gas Pi- Pipeline with its Jordan-Israel connection and the El Arish-Ashkelon offshore pipeline). Gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields can now be sold to Egypt, liquefied at Idku and Damietta, and exported to Europe as LNG. This agreement has been operational since February 2022, facilitating LNG exports to Europe during the winter. However, in summer, high domestic demand in Egypt leaves insufficient gas for full liquefaction plant operation. When President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen signed an EMGF memorandum of understanding on this matter in June 2022, it merely ratified an agreement that the European Commission had no role in negotiating and that had already been functioning independently for four months.
In October 2022, Israel and Lebanon, despite being at war and locked in a decades-long maritime border dispute, reached an agreement on their boundary. This deal alleviated Israeli concerns over Lebanese claims jeopardizing Karish’s development and allowed Lebanon to explore the area. Finally, in February 2025, Egypt and Cyprus signed an agreement enabling Cypriot gas to be processed in Egypt, liquefied, and exported to Europe (notably via Damietta).
These examples suggest that the prospect of short-term, high-value opportunities is more effective in driving agreements than long-term, structural projects requiring infrastructure that may take five years to materialize. Nevertheless, challenges remain in this region. A notable absentee from these cooperative efforts is Turkey, a subject to be addressed in a future article.
Didier Holleaux is the author of La vraie histoire du gaz [The true history of gas]. In this work, he recounts one of the geopolitical battles of gas.
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