By Paul Vartan Sookiasian
Armenia will leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization if the Russian-led military bloc does not address the country’s concerns, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed Tuesday, in his clearest remarks yet on the matter.
“We raised the question of the CSTO’s area of responsibility in Armenia, and we have not received an answer to that question,” Pashinyan told reporters at his first press conference in more than half a year.
“If the CSTO answers that question…and that answer matches Armenia’s position, it will mean the issues between Armenia and the CSTO have been addressed and resolved…If not, Armenia will leave the CSTO,” the prime minister added.
Armenia’s geopolitical shift is picking up steam with rapid developments, all of which appear to be heading toward a break with Russia.
Pashinyan’s comments Tuesday follow his interview with France 24 last month, where he said Armenia had practically “frozen” its membership in the CSTO since the alliance “has failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security toward Armenia,” referring in particular to Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia and seizure of its sovereign territory in 2021 and 2022.
But what exactly is the CSTO, and why does it matter for Armenia?
The CSTO has its origins in the Collective Security Treaty which, similar to NATO’s Article 5, considers an attack on one state an attack on all. Nonetheless, the bloc did not react to defend Armenia after those attacks.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pushed back earlier this month against Pashinyan’s recent comments on the CSTO with an ultimatum. He warned that Armenia, which he called “ungrateful,” must decide if it will remain in CSTO or not. If it leaves, Lavrov added, “we would need to reconsider many aspects of Russia-Armenia relations.”
Armenia was one of the initial six signatories to the treaty, with neighboring Azerbaijan and Georgia also signing on before it went into effect in 1994. The treaty was set to expire in 1999, but was then renewed, though without the further participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 2002, the six member states — Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — formalized the treaty as a full-fledged military alliance, an evolution likely spurred on by the ambitions of Vladimir Putin, then Russia’s relatively new president.
The CSTO’s creation was widely interpreted as a counterweight to the Western-led NATO bloc at a time when the latter was beginning to expand into central and eastern Europe. However, the CSTO’s effectiveness has long been subject to criticism, with the bloc having failed to respond to outbreaks of violence both within and between member states.
When it joined the alliance, Armenia was facing a difficult situation with two hostile neighbors and the ever-present threat of renewed conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, and so the country placed its trust in Russia and the CSTO as its primary security guarantors. However, the outbreak of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war would have serious ramifications for the durability of this arrangement.
According to Armenian officials, it was the lack of a forceful response by either Russia or the CSTO to Azerbaijan’s unprecedented September 2022 attack that sent the message to Armenia that it needed to find new security partners.
Such a realignment is no simple task, as Armenia’s entire military structure, training, and equipment are based on Russian standards, which are not compatible with Western ones. In addition, Armenia is now at one of the least secure junctures in its modern history, with Azerbaijan threatening further aggression, and so leaving even a completely ineffective alliance like the CSTO still raises the specter of increased vulnerability.
Yet a choice has to be made, as potential alternative security partners are not inclined to support a member of a Russian-backed alliance, especially in light of the war in Ukraine. Russia has a number of tools at its disposal to punish Armenia were it to try to break out of its orbit, as it has control of various sectors within Armenia, particularly with regard to energy.
It also has the ability to punish Armenia economically by hindering its exports, as Russia is Armenia’s biggest market, or even militarily by encouraging further aggression by Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has accused Russia of encouraging a coup against him, though with Russia’s diminished popularity among Armenians, any such attempt would be unlikely to garner popular support.
Armenia’s shift away from Russia is taking on a more comprehensive nature. In an interview with the Turkish television channel TRT World aired last week, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced Armenia may seek membership in the European Union. This would require withdrawal from another pillar of Russia’s leverage in the region, the Eurasian Economic Union, which would at a minimum result in further tensions.
Also in question is the status of the Russian border guards who monitor Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey. These guards have also been stationed for decades at Armenia’s main airport, Zvartnots International, despite no clear agreement stipulating their presence there. During Tuesday’s press conference, Pashinyan announced they would be withdrawn by August 1.
In attempting to completely realign itself away from a power that has long dominated the region, Armenia has entered uncharted waters. Yet in the cost-benefit analysis, weighing Moscow’s unwillingness or inability to honor its treaty obligations against the many doors CSTO membership closes, Yerevan may feel it has no other choice.
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