By Gor Petrosyan
In the tumultuous aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the echoes of ethno-political upheavals reverberated across its once-unified territories. Amongst the tapestry of conflicts, the Transnistria conflict stood as a distinctive outlier, fueled by linguistic identity and cultural nuances rather than ethnic divisions.
Roots of the Conflict
With Gorbachev’s perestroika, frozen ethnopolitical conflicts inside the USSR gradually heated up. Political liberalization in the Soviet republics brought with it the rise of nationalism that soon resulted in pressures and human rights violations against ethnic minorities, leading to protests and resistance on the part of the minorities that felt oppressed.
Among these conflicts, the Transnistria conflict was in a class of its own. It emerged in 1989 when the Moldovan parliament passed two language laws, one making Moldovan the only official language of Moldova (thereby excluding Russian, the main official language of the USSR) which mentioned a linguistic Moldovan-Romanian identity, and the second stipulating the return to the Latin alphabet that the Soviets had replaced with Cyrillic. This caused an outcry amongst the predominantly Russian-speaking residents of the region situated on the left bank of the Dniester. Protests were intensified by the partial opening of the border between Romania and Moldova in May 1990 and the widespread belief that a union between Moldova and Romania was inevitable. In September 1990, the region proclaimed itself as the Pridnestrovian (Russian for ‘Transnistrian’) Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic with the capital in Tiraspol. By November 1990, tensions escalated into the conflict’s first violent clashes.
The first unusual feature of this conflict has been that both parties in conflict claimed to be fighting for the sovereignty of Moldova, with the difference that for Chisinau, the struggle has been about containing the influence of Russia, and for Tiraspol, that of Romania.
Negotiation Format
The violent phase of the conflict ended in July 1992 with the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone and the signing in Moscow of an Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester. The agreement prescribed a 5+2 format, including Chisinau and Tiraspol as parties in conflict, Russia and Ukraine as guarantors of peace, the OSCE as mediator, and the EU and the US as observers.
Final settlement of the conflict appeared to be a distinct possibility in the early 2000s, when, upon the request of Moldova’s president, Russia moved forward with its plan of conflict resolution envisaging the federalization of Moldova, aka the ‘Kozak Plan’. However, the Moldovan government caved in to street protests by the opposition and the conflict remained frozen.
With the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the 5+2 resolution format for the Transnistria conflict has become non-functional now that the guarantors of peace are at war with each other. The second unusual feature of the conflict in Transnistria is that both guarantors of a peaceful resolution wanted to resolve the conflict through the use of force. When Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine appeared to be succeeding, there were calls in Russia to expand the military operation to the border of Transnistria and build a land bridge to it. Once Russian troops suffered failures in Ukraine, the other guarantor of the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Transnistria – Ukraine – also wanted to take military action against Russian troops deployed in Transnistria, a move that was eventually prevented by political and diplomatic means.
Economic Interdependence
The third unusual feature of the conflict in Transnistria is economic integration and interdependence between the parties. First and foremost, there is free movement of goods and persons between the two banks of the Dniester. Although there is a customs’ point at the entrance to the territory controlled by Transnistria, thousands of residents of the two banks travel between Chisinau and Tiraspol to provide for their economic needs. Transnistria’s football club, Sheriff, participates in the UEFA Cup under the Moldovan flag. Following the lifting of EU visa requirements for Moldovan citizens, tens of thousands of residents in Transnistria applied for and were granted Moldovan citizenship.
The Transnistrian economy relies on several industrial giants that were established in the late Soviet era, the most important of which are the Moldova Steel Works in Rîbnița and the Cuciurgan power station (known in Russian as the Moldavskaya power station). The electric energy produced by the latter is transported to Chisinau and provides for Moldova’s energy needs. Transnistria’s industrial enterprises remain sustainable due to a supply of natural gas from Russia that Transnistria does not pay for: the debt accrued by Transnistria is accumulated by the Republic of Moldova and currently exceeds 7 bln USD. Another unique feature of the situation is that Russian gas is still supplied to Transnistria via the territory of Ukraine even following the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s contribution to the economic sustainability of Transnistria used to be invaluable. Prior to the COVID pandemic and the war in Ukraine, it had been via Ukraine that Transnistria maintained direct uncontrolled economic relations with Russia and other countries. Its results included the emergence of a shadow economy and the economic and political monopoly of the Sheriff Holding and the Renewal Party financed by it.
The War in Ukraine and the New Format for the Conflict
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Transnistria has been blockaded by Ukraine. The result is twofold: first, the route via Chisinau has become Transnistria’s only link to the outside world; second, the Transnistrian economic and political elite has become more dependent on Chisinau, which now has full control over the trade turnover in Transnistria. Consequently, more and more residents of Transnistria regulate their legal and civic relations with the Republic of Moldova. Besides, the EU countries have become the main destination for exports of goods from Transnistria, and a new destination for labour migration for thousands of Transnistrian residents. On the whole, economic interdependence between Moldova and Transnistria has deepened after 24 February 2022, simply because Transnistria has been deprived of alternative routes.
In the light of its failures in Ukraine, Russia’s policy and attitude towards the conflict in Transnistria has undergone changes. Russia’s current political priority is to win the war against Ukraine; hence, Russia is short of time and resources that it could invest in other conflicts. In fact, the new foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation does not even mention Moldova or Transnistria, indicating changes in political priorities. Apparently, the short-term goal of Russia is to keep the conflict in Transnistria frozen, but this requires resources. Whether any will be invested depends on military developments in Ukraine.
Comparative aspect
Despite having some commonalities in terms of their origin, the post-Soviet conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh have evolved and transformed in different ways. A key reason has been that the conflict in Transnistria was based on linguistic and cultural identity rather than ethnicity. In addition, the Republic of Moldova is substantially different from Azerbaijan in terms of its political culture. It considers Transnistrian residents its citizens and does not aim to force them out by means of an economic blockade, which would in fact have been easy to impose given Transnistria’s lack of other land connections. Nor does Moldova use military threats with regard to Transnistria. The difference in political cultures is enhanced by the fact that Azerbaijan’s main ally in the Karabakh conflict is Turkey, whereas in the conflict in Transnistria, Moldova’s strategic partner is Romania, an EU member state.
Gor Petrosyan is a political scientist at Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute.
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