By Alexander Pracht
Discussions about the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’ were revived last month by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who insisted that a transport link connecting mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave must be established through Armenia’s sovereign territory and put under Moscow’s control, as the three countries agreed after the 2020 war. Lavrov’s statements triggered harsh opposition from Iran, one of Moscow’s most important strategic partners at the moment.
What is the ‘Zangezur corridor?’
The Russia-brokered ceasefire statement that concluded the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war includes an article concerning regional transport links, including a proposed route between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan exclave. Azerbaijani officials refer to that as the “Zangezur corridor.”
The ceasefire says that “all economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked” and that “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections” between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Additionally, Russian border guards are expected to become “responsible for overseeing the transport connections”. Despite initial speculation that the corridor would be opened immediately and placed under Russian control, the situation has so far remained unchanged, with regional transit closed.
Since 2020, Azerbaijan’s public statements on the “Zangezur corridor” have been mixed. Thus, Baku signed a deal with Tehran last October to build a railway connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through Iran. This agreement signaled a potential alternative route, and several weeks later, Hikmet Hajiyev, Azerbaijani President Ilham’s Aliyev chief foreign policy advisor, indicated that Baku was no longer interested in pursuing a corridor through Armenia.
However, in a sharp reversal just two months later, Hajiyev emphasized that Baku had not abandoned the idea of a corridor passing through Armenia.
“The route through Armenia is Yerevan’s obligation, which they must fulfill,” he said. Hajiyev reaffirmed that Azerbaijan still seeks a direct route where people and cargo traveling between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan would not be subject to Armenian border or customs checks.
A solution with no border checkpoints and Russia’s presence would make the corridor extraterritorial, which would mean that Armenia would effectively lose control over a portion of its sovereign territory and internationally recognized border. Aside from Yerevan, this is also unacceptable for Tehran, as Iran’s only open land border is with Armenia, which serves as an important “corridor” in its own right, allowing movement of goods and people and a connection with the rest of the world.
For his part, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently stressed that the statement does not imply that any third party, “particularly Russia,” would physically control the route, nor does it question Armenia’s jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory. He also reiterated that Armenia had proposed to set up border checkpoints on both sides of the route, and said that “Azerbaijan is not taking advantage of this opportunity.”
Is Baku really desperate to have the corridor established?
Tigran Grigoryan, the head of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank, told CivilNet Wednesday he believes that Azerbaijan has recently changed its approach toward the corridor issue.
“I don’t think the transport links issue is urgent for Baku. We’ve seen that Russia has been more interested in this as of late. For Russia, this is one of the few remaining chances to preserve influence in the region. As for Azerbaijan, their strategy on the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’ has changed from constant threats to blackmail,” Grigoryan said.
He added, “What they are saying is: No other transport routes in the region will be unblocked before we have access to the corridor. Thus, at this time, they are threatening with closed communications, rather than war.”
Elchin Amirbayov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador-at-large, indicated in August that Yerevan and Baku had agreed to temporarily set aside the issue of reopening communication to avoid delaying a broader normalization deal, with the understanding that both countries would revisit the topic at a later date.
“Dropping the ‘Zangezur corridor’ clause from the peace treaty draft has been Azerbaijan’s goal since the September 2023 aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh, same as with other important issues,” Grigoryan explained. “Baku is eager to use other instruments, and has never wanted to resolve this issue by signing the peace treaty. In the best case scenario, the treaty might have a small vague paragraph on the opening of communications with mentions of respecting sovereignty, reciprocity, and so on.”
Moscow and Tehran go public about their disagreements
Following Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks, Iran summoned the Russian ambassador to Tehran to express its displeasure at Moscow’s stance. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, said his government was concerned that the “Zangezur corridor” could threaten his country’s strategic border with Armenia and exacerbate regional tensions.
“It is very unusual for regimes like this to make such disagreements public knowledge. So, it was a very strong message coming from Tehran that the Zangezur corridor is a clear red line. Given Iran’s importance as a strategic partner, Russia will definitely take Iran’s discontent into consideration,” Grigoryan said.
“However,” Grigoryan continued, “if Moscow and Tehran discuss this issue without involving Yerevan, they might agree on a solution that would be beneficial for them but harmful for Armenia. Therefore, Yerevan should be taking a more proactive approach so that the problem is not solved without its participation.”
The strain in relations between Russia and Iran is notable given their strengthened ties since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As Russia deals with growing economic and diplomatic isolation, its alliance with Tehran has become increasingly significant in mitigating Western pressure. Moreover, Tehran has reportedly become a vital supplier of weapons to Russia, including kamikaze drones and, most recently, ballistic missiles.
What solution is Washington interested in?
For the United States, achieving a peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku without Russian mediation is crucial to diminish Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, and, more broadly, in Eurasia.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien has emphasized the strategic significance of establishing a corridor through Azerbaijan and Armenia, which would offer a substantial alternative to current trade routes through Georgia. This could enhance trade opportunities for Central Asian countries and reduce the influence of Russia and China. O’Brien has also highlighted the necessity of securing Armenian authorities’ involvement and consent in developing this transit route.
The United States would be opposed to either a Russia-controlled corridor through Armenia or a route through Iran, which it considers an adversary. The “Crossroads of Peace” proposal put forward by Pashinyan’s government, which aims to unlock highways and railways connecting Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey, could be viewed favorably by Washington, but has so far found zero support in Baku.
Azerbaijan’s short-term strategies
COP29, the United Nations global climate summit, scheduled to take place in November in Baku, is of significant importance to Azerbaijan. As a major player in global energy markets, Azerbaijan is keen on showcasing its role and maintaining a stable international image during this high-profile conference.
“At this point, I do not see any preconditions for a large-scale escalation, especially before the COP29 summit,” Grigoryan told CivilNet.
In addition, Baku might be inclined to wait for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, also in November. The results could impact U.S. foreign policy and its stance on regional conflicts, potentially influencing Aliyev’s strategic calculations.
“The outcome of the U.S. presidential election will be very important for the region. I think Aliyev has made it very clear that he wants Trump to win, which is understandable, as the U.S. engagement in the region will likely decrease with Trump in office, just like during his first term. This will allow Aliyev and other authoritarian leaders to promote policies based on the use of force. So, Trump’s victory can be very dangerous for Armenia” Grigoryan concluded.
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