In an interview with CivilNet’s Stella Mehrabekyan, Senior Expert on Eastern Europe at Bertelsmann Stiftung Miriam Kosmehl discusses the EU’s enlargement policy amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and the potential shifts in EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus following the Georgian elections.
How has the war in Ukraine changed the EU’s traditional approach to the accession process?
The full-scale war led to a significant policy shift regarding the EU’s eastern neighbors, including some of them in the EU’s enlargement policy – specifically Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and initially also Georgia. This is because of Vladimir Putin’s clear and since 2021 openly articulated intent to reshape the European and global security order.
Russia’s imperialist full-scale invasion and rhetoric made the EU abandon its previous distinction between neighborhood and enlargement policies, seeking in wider enlargement the means to prevail as a stronger actor.
Is this a lasting shift? We can observe that at least Ukraine and Moldova retain the membership perspective and first Intergovernmental Conferences in June 2024 officially opened accession negotiations. This has been remarkably quick, because only two years passed between giving EU candidate status to Ukraine/Moldova and now launching the negotiations.
It is important to understand, though: accession negotiations are not traditional negotiations in the sense of compromise on the rules themselves, but negotiations regarding the timeframe, methods and support needed to achieve alignment with EU laws and standards. Former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt once coined the term “negotiated surrender”. Moreover, this is a marathon, not a sprint, until membership.
Now to the enlargement methodology. The aim has been to open and close negotiations across chapters within thematic areas in a quicker way. And to assess and steer reforms more effectively.
The interesting question is less about methodology, but whether EU governance structures, policies and decision-making will be reformed and adapted to make the EU itself fit for enlargement by eight or nine more members.
There’s been debate about whether the EU should adopt a more flexible, multi-speed integration model to accommodate new members. Given the urgent geopolitical pressures in Eastern Europe, what’s your assessment of this approach?
There have been several suggestions around, from accession in four, predefined stages to gradual accession and integration into certain sectors only.
But the geopolitical pressures you mention in Eastern Europe – the security situation overall for Europe, the global world order – is completely different compared to previous enlargements. The European security order is challenged, because Russia is waging a conventional war under the protective shield of nuclear deterrence, and it is not clear the US will continue to engage in Europe as before.
The European Commission formulated that the enlargement process is “a geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity”. But those that want to join or are already candidate countries are and presumably will remain in a tense security situation with contested borders even after Russia’s war against Ukraine ends. In Southeastern Europe we have a lack of stability for other reasons.
So while there is a new rationale for enlargement being understood as “strategic” because of a tense security situation and global rivalries, the EU is at best a security provider “in the making”. And if the main focus of your question is on the geopolitical shift, the dire security situation, then my response is that making enlargement successful is less about a more flexible integration model and more about effective security, having the military capabilities to prevail if diplomacy fails or is futile.
Recent elections in Georgia in which the ruling Georgian Dream party won 54 percent of the vote have raised questions about democratic backsliding in this country. How might this affect Georgia’s EU candidate status prospects?
Georgia’s candidate status has been frozen before the recent elections in response to new repressive legislation put forward by the ruling Georgian Dream party. It will remain frozen with the preliminary findings of the election observers documenting irregularities in relation to the elections and doubts about it having been fair.
While I have also heard arguments that Georgia losing its candidate status plays into the hands of Georgian Dream and Russia, the overwhelming opinion I perceive is that the EU would risk its credibility if it upheld Georgia’s candidate status despite Georgia’s democratic backsliding.
Armenia has been recently showing increased interest in closer ties with the European Union, particularly following regional security challenges. How do you evaluate Armenia’s European perspective in light of its complex relationship with Russia and the ongoing regional dynamics?
There is CEPA (the Comprehensive & Enhanced Partnership Agreement) for a reason. Having fallen out with Russia, it is understandable that Armenia is seeking the EU as its strategic partner. The problem is, the EU has not yet shown itself ready as a security provider. And I am not sure Armenia can count on particular EU member states, at least not sufficiently, in case there are serious security threats. By the way, this uncertainty about the EU as a security provider is also why the Georgian Dream has been able to successfully campaign focusing on many Georgians’ fear of war coming back to their country.
In theory, Armenia could appeal to the United Nations Security Council in the event of aggression, but any action would depend on the Security Council’s ability to reach a consensus.
Armenia has recently accelerated its EU engagement, while Georgia’s democratic trajectory has faced scrutiny. How might this shifting dynamic affect the EU’s regional approach to the South Caucasus?
As I said, the problem is the EU’s weakness so far as a security provider only “in the making”, also because of challenges regarding unity and political will, trade-offs between different interests. But factually for now the EU is weak in terms of security and defense. The regional situation in the South Caucasus has become more difficult with Georgia’s ruling party shifting closer to Russia, because deeper EU integration would have decreased Georgian Dream’s power status. The fact that the EU has frozen Georgia’s candidacy status is not an incentive for the Georgian Dream to change course, because they do not want deeper EU integration.
The crucial question is: What does it mean for Armenia to have an unstable neighbor in Georgia also that is closer to Russia and China than to the EU?
Armenia is moreover a land-locked country and thus at a disadvantage here too. Its diversification desires – and needs – will be less accommodated with a Georgia that isolates from the EU. And the risk of war with Azerbaijan remains over border demarcation and transport links.
So, Armenia is in a very challenging spot with a more Russia-dependent Georgia on one side and difficult neighbors like Azerbaijan and Iran on the other side. I suppose normalizing ties with the fourth neighbor Turkey is more and more important but I am in no position to assess Armenian-Turkish relations.
As far as I know Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Erdogan met personally for the first time in 2022 on the sidelines of a European Political Community meeting in Prague; 2023 Pashinyan attended Erdogan’s inauguration following an election victory. Is it the second attempt at reconciliation? A previous agreement to open the joint border was never ratified, I believe, the border only briefly opened in 2023 to allow in aid after an earthquake in southern Turkey and northern Syria.
Some observers suggest that Georgia’s electoral developments could create a new competitive dynamic between South Caucasus nations seeking EU integration. Do you see Armenia potentially benefiting from positioning itself as a more reliable partner for democratic reform?
I think this is not about Armenia benefitting from a competition with Georgia, especially if there is a lack of security and stability in the South Caucasus region. Recent developments under the Georgian Dream, the evolving political dynamics, Georgia’s rapprochement to Russia, impact on the situation in the South Caucasus, making it even more so a region of instability and fragile peace.
In summary, the evolving political dynamics in Georgia, particularly its rapprochement with Russia under the ruling Georgian Dream party, have significant implications for the stability and security of the South Caucasus region, affecting Armenia and its strategic environment.
Background
Miriam Kosmehl has been Senior Expert on Eastern Europe in the Program “Europe’s Future” at Bertelsmann Stiftung since October 2017. Her recent research focused on geoeconomic interdependencies and geopolitical antagonisms in the EU neighborhood regions as well as on Ukraine. Previously, Head of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation’s office for Ukraine and Belarus based in Kyiv (January 2012 – August 2017).
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