By Jack Dulgarian
Azerbaijan increased soft power prestige by hosting its first multilateral diplomatic event this month after the Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) ethnic cleansing. Baku has received considerable international criticisms regarding contributions to climate change, last year’s Artsakh seizure, illegal detention of Armenians and fraudulent domestic elections.
It is well known that few tangible agreements are achieved at multilateral conferences such as the United Nations General Assembly, or in this case, the Conference of the Parties (COP29) on Climate Change. Regardless, Azerbaijan demonstrated it can successfully host such an event and gain traction in soft power through international cultural events such as Formula 1.
Following these events, how will the regime continue to strategize its diplomacy, informational campaigns, and soft power strategy for 2025?
Baku hosted this year’s COP29 because it seeks to raise its status to top tier “middle power” on the global stage. Middle powers have significant influence in their respective regions, but lack strong global authority. Middle powers also have leverage. When assessing how to act in a region, great powers must consider middle power intent, capabilities, and reactions. For example, China cannot implement its Asia-Pacific economic strategy without considering its relationship with Australia. The United States cannot operate in Iraq and Syria without considering Turkey’s strategic intentions. And Russia must factor Denmark in Moscow’s arctic grand strategy.
It is likely that Azerbaijan believes it can achieve formidable middle power status due to its recent military victories, vigorous relationship with Turkey, unorthodox partnership with Russia, and ability to be a regional strategic counterweight to Iran. Azerbaijan’s global bids for prestige must be taken seriously as Baku eyes to shape the next decade of diplomatic and economic relations in the area.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan looked to diversify its export of oil and gas without traversing through Russia. Presidents Haydar and Ilham Aliyev built a strong Western rapport through energy companies during the late 1990s. These relationships proved to be a great strategic move – the revolutionary Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline was planned and built with Western assistance. During the early stages of the War on Terror, Azerbaijan allowed overflight, refueling, and landing rights for U.S. aircraft bound for Iraq and Afghanistan. In reciprocity, the Bush Administration pushed for more Eurasian energy diversification from Turkey to as far as Kazakhstan, with Azerbaijan as a geopolitical conduit. Were it not for these developments, Baku would not be able to export energy to isolated Israel, which has yielded a new partnership and drone provider for Baku’s war machine.
Going forward, Azerbaijan’s diplomatic and soft-power strategy will depend on two major questions: (1) How will nations diplomatically and strategically engage Baku in the aftermath of the Artsakh ethnic cleansing? (2) How will Baku balance engagement with opposing powers in a complex geopolitical neighborhood and hostile era of great power competition?
Towards the United States: Azerbaijan will probably look to position itself as Washington’s best partner to counterbalance Iran and Russia in the region. Moreover, Western energy companies have financial interests with Azerbaijan which Baku will seek both for diplomatic leverage and for new economic opportunities.
However, three US groups may present challenges to President Ilham Aliyev’s intent to grow his relationship with incoming U.S. President Donald Trump. These groups aiming to thwart US cooperation with Azerbaijan are: (1) The religious right wing that will continue to draw attention to the Artskah catastrophe, (2) the environmentally conscious left wing that will criticize Western reliance on fossil fuels. (3) The Armenian diaspora which will continue to press for the release of Artaksh POWs as well as severe aid and military to military ties between Washington and Baku.
Towards Russia: Baku continues to grow its partnership with Russia, primarily through economic ties. At the same time, Azerbaijan presents itself as an alternative energy provider to the West with no baggage of sanctions. Six days before the Russia-Ukraine War began, Russian company Lukaoil purchased a $1.45 Billion USD stake in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Project. Two days prior to the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally.”
The flashpoint for conflict in their relationship is exemplified through differences on connecting Turkmenistan’s proposed pipeline across the Caspian via Azerbaijan to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. If Turkmenistan wants to export energy to Europe, it may only do so through Russia.
Towards the European Union: Azerbaijan will almost certainly push for increasing energy exports to the EU. Many states in the EU have brought great attention to the issues with Azerbaijan as an energy provider. Yet, Baku will likely stand to benefit as the EU remains focused on the Russia-Ukraine War, the economy, and the exacerbated trend of nationalism versus Europeanism.
Towards Iran: Baku will probably seek detente with Iran following last year’s significant rift in relations. As Iran remains distracted via its conflict with Israel, inflation, and domestic unrest, Tehran cannot afford more problems in its backyard. It seems Baku’s work on the “Iranian Southern Corridor” has settled the dispute with Iran for now. Nonetheless, an Azeri seizure of southern Armenian territory may drive the two into a conflict as Iran would perceive the operation as an existential threat to its economic relationship with Armenia.
Towards Turkey: Azerbaijan’s strategic achievement to seize Artsakh could not have been possible without its strongest ally Turkey. Military, diplomatic and informational campaigns will continue and probably increase, but the Azerbaijani economic relationship with Turkey is dependent on Ankara’s management of its inflation and trade with the EU.
It is plausible that Israel’s continued wars could negatively affect the Azerbaijan-Turkey relationship. While Azerbaijan stands to benefit from Israeli energy dependence, Turkey’s rhetoric and sympathy for HAMAS may escalate to punishing Israel by limiting or halting energy exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.
Towards China: Baku’s application to Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) signifies its commitment to diversify its economic and diplomatic power across the world. Beijing touts BRICS as a political-economic alternative framework to the Western led world order. In October 2023, Azerbaijan and China (along with Kazakhstan and Georgia) increased cooperation in infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted transit of goods via rail. China is one of Azerbaijan’s biggest advocates for accession into the World Trade Organization. While enhancing its economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, Baku will need to balance and navigate this relationship with Washington in the context of the great power competition. .
Azerbaijan’s high-profile diplomatic and soft-power campaigns will likely continue to increase throughout the next year. Baku’s greatest challenge will require balancing its rhetoric from its domestic and foreign policy belligerence. Greater powers will be observing how each of Baku’s decisions will impact the highly complex region.
Jack Dulgarian is a professional analyst and consultant working in national security and defense. He previously wrote on building a pragmatic Armenian Space Doctrine for CIVILNET. In 2023, he authored an analysis scenario-casting how Russia would thwart Armenia’s security prior to the fall and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. The views herein are this author’s only.
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