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Armenia’s concessions legitimize Azerbaijan’s coercive actions, expert warns

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By Karen Harutyunyan

Armenia’s continuous compliance with Azerbaijan’s preconditions under the threat of force is legitimizing Baku’s illegal actions, warns Benyamin Poghosyan, senior analyst at APRI Armenia think tank. In an interview with CivilNet, Poghosyan argues that Armenia is inadvertently sending a message that Azerbaijan has legitimate grounds for making certain demands, which further legitimizes Azerbaijan’s coercive approach.

This dynamic was clearly demonstrated in April 2024, when under the threat of war, Armenia agreed to a 12.5 km border delimitation in the Tavush and Qazakh regions. The process resulted in Azerbaijan reclaiming its four abandoned villages while retaining Armenian agricultural lands in the same sector. While Armenian authorities present this as a significant achievement in the 1000 km border delimitation process, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev characterized it not as a dialogue but as a “monologue” – their diktat to Armenia.

The process, which was approved at the legislative level in Armenia through the Constitutional Court, parliament, and presidential signature, was merely confirmed in Azerbaijan through a presidential decree. According to Poghosyan, this process carried out under explicit threats of force and in violation of international law, gained unexpected legitimacy when the international community welcomed it as a step toward normalizing relations between countries that had been in conflict for 35 years.

The situation has become more complex with Azerbaijan’s recent demand to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been the primary format for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution since 1992. Azerbaijan’s concern stems from the fact that the group’s very existence, even if only in legal terms, implies the ongoing nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The group, co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France, had previously proposed various conflict resolution options, including the 2007 Madrid Principles that envisioned the possibility of self-determination through a referendum for Nagorno-Karabakh.

After several statements following the 2020 war, including one in December 2021 that called the conflict “unresolved,” the OSCE Minsk Group has effectively ceased functioning. 

Azerbaijan is now actively working to remove any reference to Nagorno-Karabakh from legal, political, and geopolitical discourse, particularly following the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in September 2023.

Armenia’s position on dissolving the Minsk Group has notably shifted. Initially, Armenia maintained that the group could only be dissolved after signing a peace treaty. However, following Aliyev’s recent threats, including opening a corridor through southern Armenia by force, authorities in Yerevan have indicated openness to dissolving the group even before a viable peace treaty is signed.

See: Pashinyan proposes dissolution of OSCE Minsk Group following Azerbaijan’s war threats

Poghosyan contends that Azerbaijan’s president is not genuinely interested in signing a peace treaty with Armenia, as evidenced by the continuous introduction of new preconditions. These include the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, the removal of EU observers from the Armenian side of the border, and demands for changes to Armenia’s constitution. 

“These are not preconditions but pretexts for avoiding peace,” Poghosyan emphasizes. “If we call them preconditions, we accept that Azerbaijan genuinely wants to sign a peace treaty but has objective concerns. In my deep conviction, Azerbaijan doesn’t want to sign a peace treaty because it won’t benefit from it and might create problems.”

The Armenian government appears to maintain a constructive approach, agreeing to almost all preconditions to avoid giving Azerbaijan pretexts for new escalation. However, Poghosyan notes that despite Armenia’s efforts, Azerbaijan isn’t ruling out escalation and is even preparing for it, including militarily.

The main way to reduce the risk of war, according to the analyst, is by increasing the cost Azerbaijan would have to pay – both in terms of military operations and in terms of diplomatic setbacks. However, he acknowledges the uncertainty about what price Azerbaijan’s military-political leadership is willing to pay to achieve its objectives.

The post Armenia’s concessions legitimize Azerbaijan’s coercive actions, expert warns appeared first on CIVILNET.


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